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CIVIL RIGHTS

Supreme Court Takes Up School Bathroom Issue
Transgender high schooler Gavin Grimm’s effort to use boys’ facilities could establish key precedent
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD
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n a case that could have significant
implications for how the courts view gender identity discrimination — and perhaps sexual orientation, as well — the
Supreme Court, on October 28, announced it
will review the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’
decision in Gloucester County School Board v.
G.G., which upheld the Department of Education’s requirement that a Virginia school district let a transgender teenage boy use the boys’
restroom facilities.
The April 19 ruling by the Fourth Circuit
overturned a 2015 district court ruling that
found that the DOE overstepped its authority
in its interpretation of Title IX of the Education
Amendments Act of 1972.
The Gloucester case has been closely watched
by LGBT lawyers and legal commentators
because it provides the high court with a vehicle to examine the broader question of whether
federal laws prohibiting discrimination “because
of sex,” most passed decades ago, can now be
construed to forbid gender identity discrimination and, maybe, also sexual orientation discrimination, despite the obvious fact that legislators
in 1960s and 1970s had no such intent when
enacting those statutes.
Framed a different way, the question is one
repeatedly raised by the late Justice Antonin
Scalia: Are we governed by the intentions of our
legislators or should the courts rely instead on
reasonable interpretations of the actual text of
the law? Scalia, who was an ardent foe of using
“legislative history” as a method of statutory
interpretation, decisively argued that courts
should focus on the language of the statute, not
viewed in isolation but rather in the context of
the overall law, including any specific declaration of congressional purpose contained in it.
On that point, ironically, this justice who
was notoriously hostile to gay rights claims won
unanimous concurrence by his colleagues in a
significant 1998 ruling that laid the groundwork
for advances in LGBT rights. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the court held
that a man employed in an all-male workplace
could maintain an action for hostile environment
sexual harassment under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Right Act, even though it was unlikely that
Congress at that time was thinking about samesex harassment when it included “sex” as a forbidden grounds for workplace discrimination.
Relying on the statutory text, Scalia wrote that
Joseph Oncale, who was sodomized with a bar
of soap and threatened with rape, would have
a valid Title VII claim if he could prove that he
was harassed “because of sex” as specified by

the 1964 law. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has prominently
quoted from Scalia’s Oncale opinion in its federal employment rulings in the last several years
holding that discrimination because of gender
identity and sexual orientation is “necessarily”
discrimination “because of sex,” even though the
1964 Congress would not have thought so.
Though the claims of Gavin Grimm, the transgender plaintiff in the Gloucester case, do not
directly involve Title VII, federal courts have generally followed Title VII precedents when they
interpret the sex discrimination ban in Title IX,
as the Fourth Circuit explained in this case.

Gavin Grimm, a transgender Virginia high school student whose
effort to use an appropriate bathroom at his Virginia high school is
going to the US Supreme Court.

The controversy arose when fellow students
and their parents objected to Grimm using the
boys’ restrooms during fall term of his sophomore year, in 2014. The high school’s principal
had given Grimm permission to use the boys’
restrooms after learning of his transition and
his discomfort with continuing to use the girls’
restrooms, since he was dressing, grooming,
and — most significantly — strongly identifying as male.
Responding to the complaints, the Gloucester County School Board established a policy
under which students were required to use the
restroom consistent with their “biological sex”
as identified on their birth certificate or to use a
private gender-neutral restroom, of which there
were a few in the high school. Grimm enlisted
the American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia to
sue the school board, and the case was assigned
to District Judge Robert G. Doumar, who was
appointed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981.
Grimm’s complaint relied on Title IX as well as

the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
In ruling on Grimm’s motion for preliminary
injunction, Doumar found that he could not
sustain a Title IX claim because its regulations
expressly allow schools to maintain separate
restroom facilities for boys and girls based on
“sex,” so it was not unlawful for Grimm’s school
to require him to use restrooms consistent with
his “sex” which, in the school board’s view, was
female.
The district judge rejected the ACLU’s claim
that he should defer to the DOE interpretation
of the “bathroom regulation,” articulated in a letter the department’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR)
sent in January 2015 as a “party in interest” in
response to Grimm’s request for its assistance.
The OCR took the position, consistent with
recent developments in sex discrimination law,
that Grimm should be treated as a boy because
it was undisputed that this is his gender identity
and so under the regulation he was entitled to
use the boy’s restroom — though he could also
request as an accommodation to have access to
a private gender-neutral facility.
To Doumar, the regulation’s text was clear
and unambiguous, so the OCR’s attempt to
interpret the regulation in favor of Grimm’s
claim was not entitled to deference from the
court. To accord that interpretation deference,
he wrote, would allow the OCR to “create a
de facto new regulation.” If the OCR wanted
to change the regulation, the judge found, it
should go through the time-consuming procedures set out in the Administrative Procedure
Act, which would be subject to review in the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In his opinion, Doumar referred to Grimm
as a “natal female,” unwilling to credit the
idea that for Title IX purposes he should be
treated as a boy. The case, the judge concluded, presented the simple question whether
the school board had to let a girl use the boy’s
restroom, and under the “clear” regulation
the answer was “no.”
Doumar dismissed Grimm’s Title IX claim,
and reserved judgment on his Equal Protection
claim.
When Grimm appealed to the Fourth Cir cuit, Doumar was reversed in a 2-1 opinion
this past April 19. Where Doumar saw clarity in
the regulation, the Fourth Circuit majority saw
ambiguity. Though Title IX clearly called for separate facilities for boys and girls, it said nothing
directly about which restrooms transgender students could use. Unlike Doumar, the majority
was unwilling to accept the school board’s argu-

c

SUPREME COURT, continued on p.13

November 10 - 23, 2016 | GayCityNews.nyc

c

SUPREME COURT, from p.12

ment that a person’s sex is definitely established by their birth certificate, taking took note of the developing case law in other circuits and
in many district courts accepting
the proposition that sex discrimination laws are concerned not just
with genetic or “biological” sex but
rather with the range of factors and
characteristics that go into gender, including gender identity and
expression.
Many federal courts, including
several on the appellate level, now
accept the proposition that gender
identity and sex are inextricably
related, that gender dysphoria and
transgender identity are real phenomena that deeply affect the identity of people, and that transgender
people are entitled to be treated consistent with their gender identity.
Given the ambiguity it identified,
the Fourth Circuit relied on Auer
v. Robbins, a 1997 Supreme Court
ruling that an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation should be given controlling
weight by the court unless that
interpretation is “plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation
or statute.” A reasonable agency
interpretation of an ambiguous regulation, then, should be given deference by the court. The majority
sent the matter back to Doumar for
reconsideration and stressed the
urgency of the matter.
Doumar responded quickly,
granting Grimm the preliminary
injunction he sought on June 23.
Seeking a stay of that injunction,
the school board was unsuccessful
with both Doumar and the Fourth
Circuit, but won a stay from the
Supreme Court on August 3 in a
5-3 vote, before Grimm was able to
start his senior year.
One among the five-court majority, Justice Stephen Breyer, took
the unusual step of explaining his
decision to vote with the court’s
four-member conservative faction,
saying it was an “accommodation.”
In retrospect, it seems likely Breyer
understood the four conservatives
would provide the votes necessary
to hear the case on appeal and
was voting to maintain the status
quo pending final resolution at the
Supreme Court.
After the school board filed its
petition for high court review,
more than a dozen amicus briefs
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in support or opposition were
quickly filed, as well, including
briefs from a number of states
and members of Congress. Media
interest in this case will undoubtedly remain very high.
The Supreme Court has agreed
to consider two questions raised in
the school board petition: whether
the 1997 Auer precedent is appropriately applied in a case the school
board described as “an unpublished agency letter that, among
other things, does not carry the
force of law and was adopted in the
context of the very dispute in which
deference is sought,” and whether the DOE’s interpretation of Title
IX and the bathroom regulation
should be “given effect.”

Unlike Doumar,
the majority
was unwilling to
accept the school
board’s argument
that a person’s
sex is definitely
established by their
birth certificate,
taking took note of the
developing case law
in other circuits and
in many district courts.

The court could go down several
different paths in resolving these
questions. It might agree with the
school board that no deference is
due to an agency position formulated in response to a particular case
and expressed in an unpublished
agency letter — though the Fourth
Circuit noted that the DOE published online an OCR statement
setting forth the same view a month
before its letter in the Grimm case.
The court making this finding
would send the case back to the
Fourth Circuit for its reconsideration of whether the Title IX claim
was properly dismissed by Doumar
at the outset in the absence of any
requirement to defer to the DOE
interpretation.
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Or, the high court could tackle
the substantive issue and decide
whether interpreting Title IX to
extend to gender identity discrimination claims is a viable interpretation, in light of its seminal 1989
ruling in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that an employer’s use of sex
stereotypes in denying an employee’s promotion was evidence of
intentional discrimination based
on “sex.” It was that ruling that
eventually led federal courts to
conclude that because transgender
people generally do not conform to
sex stereotypes concerning their
“biological” sex at birth, discrimination against them is a form of
“sex discrimination” in violation
of federal laws including the Fair
Credit Act, the Violence Against
Women Act, and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.
The EEOC also relied on Price
Waterhouse in reaching its 2012
conclusion that transgender
plaintiffs could assert discrimination claims under Title VII. The
Sixth and 11th Circuit Courts
of Appeals have similarly looked
to that 1989 case in finding that
claims of gender identity discrimination asserted by public employees should be treated the same as
sex discrimination claims under
the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
Were the Supreme Court to rule
by majority vote that laws banning
discrimination “because of sex”
also “necessarily” cover discrimination because of gender identity, rather than issuing a narrower ruling focusing solely on Title
IX, one could plausibly argue that
the pending Equality Act need not

include the category of “gender
identity” in order to establish a
federal policy against gender identity discrimination under all sex
discrimination laws. The Supreme
Court, however, has generally preferred to decide statutory interpretation cases on narrow grounds.
This case will most likely be
argued early in 2017, and it may
not be decided until the end of the
Court’s term in June. Thus, it is
possible that Grimm could win but
never personally benefit as a student at Gloucester County’s high
school, since he should complete
his students there next spring.
The Supreme Court has not
granted as many petitions as usual
so far this fall, leading to speculation that it is trying to avoid granting review in cases where the justices might be predictably split
evenly on the outcome and so not
be able to render a decision establishing a precedent. If the Senate
Republicans stand firm on their
position that President Barack
Obama’s nominee for the vacant
seat, US Court of Appeals Judge
Merrick Garland, will not be considered for confirmation, it is possible that the Court will have only
eight justices when the Gloucester
case is argued.
A tie vote by the court would
leave in place the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in Grimm’s favor, but it
would not establish any precedent beyond there. And there is
also the possibility that Grimm’s
graduation from high school will
be found to have mooted the case.
Since the case was brought by him
rather than the DOE or the Justice
Department, Grimm’s standing
remains an issue throughout consideration of this case.
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